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CONTRACT LAW
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: CONTRACT LAW AND
MORALITY
NATHAN OMAN*
If one listens to the voices that can be heard in many corners of
the legal academy, now is not an auspicious time to construct moral
theories of contract law.1 Some articulate writers have suggested
that virtually all of our disputes are actually empirical rather than
moral. John 0. McGinnis has written provocatively in this vein that
politically, most people within modern industrial society adhere
to a rather narrow range of values, at least in the economic
realm. They favor more prosperity, better education and health
care, and other such goods that make for a flourishing life. As to
these issues, what is debated is which political program will in
fact broadly deliver these goods.2
According to McGinnis, we stand at the threshold of a new age of
empiricism in which technology is dramatically reducing the costs
of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data. Informed opinion
will gradually converge on empirically driven conclusions, and the
real danger will be "the narcissism of small differences, in which
individuals overlook the agreements they have to focus even more
virulently on the disagreements that remain."3
* Assistant Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
1. See, e.g., Editorial, The Empirical Turn in Legal Education, 89 JUDICATURE 312, 312
(2006) ("A change is happening in America's law schools. In myriad ways, legal education and
scholarship are increasingly adopting the perspectives and tools of the social sciences.").
2. John 0. McGinnis, The Age of the Empirical, POLY REV., June & July 2006, at 47, 48.
3. Id. at 56.
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In a world dominated by empiricism, the moral theory of contract
seems like an anachronism, a throwback to a premodern world of
ethical abstractions that ought to give way before the juggernaut
of common sense and social science. In the face of increasingly
attractive alternatives, would-be moral theorists of contract 4 must
offer a defense of the continuing relevance of their conversation.
One can, of course, offer cheap metadismissals of empiricism. We
have been on the doorstep of the triumph of social science before,
only to see grandiose hopes give way to more modest conclusions.'
Such a response, however, does not really provide an apology for
moral theorizing about contract law.
William James suggests that theories are "instruments, not
answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don't lie back upon
them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again
by their aid."' Seen in this light, moral theories of contract are tools
that help us to deal with two basic kinds of puzzles: interpretive and
normative. The interpretive puzzle was set up nearly a half century
ago when H.L.A. Hart largely discredited the idea that law can be
wholly reduced to a series of threats and incentives.7 This does not
mean, of course, that law cannot be fruitfully studied as a system of
incentives.8 It does mean, however, that the study of law is not
4. I count myself among their number. See Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy
Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENy. U. L. REV. 101 (2005);
Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2005) (book
review).
5. One philosopher of social science has summed up the situation:
In varying social disciplines there seem to be moments at which a
breakthrough to cumulating knowledge has been achieved: Adam Smith's
Wealth of Nations, or Emile Durkheim's work in Suicide, or perhaps John
Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, or B. F.
Skinner's Behavior of Organisms, for instance. But subsequent developments
have never confirmed such assessments. Though the social sciences have aimed
at predicting and explaining human behavior and its consequences at least since
Thucydides in the fifth century B.C., some say we are really no better at it than
the Greeks.
ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 8 (1988).
6. WILLIAM JAMES, What Pragmatism Means, in SELECTED WRITINGS 3, 7 (G.H. Bird ed.,
1995).
7. The decisive attack on this approach was H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, especially
chapters II, III, and IV. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
8. The incredibly rich literature on contract law produced by the law and economics
movement is sufficient evidence of this. Even some of its most gifted practitioners, however,
have questioned the sole sufficiency of the economic analysis of contract law. See, e.g., Eric A.
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exhausted by such an approach. There is also what Hart called the
"internal" point of view.9 Rather than showing us the law simply as
an institutional or behavioral system, the goal of elucidating the law
from this internal point of view is
to understand the law from the standpoint of practitioners who
ask not only, "How may we carry on this practice in a way that
is faithful to its inherent norms?, [" but rather, "How may we
carry on this practice in a way that is faithful to norms that are
both inherent in it and reflectively acceptable to us?"10
Moral theories of contract seek to provide such an internal perspec-
tive and in so doing extend our understanding of law beyond what
can be offered by empiricism alone.
The second problem, for which moral theory is a tool, is norma-
tive. Before we can deploy the tools of social science to illuminate
policy debates, we must have some sense of what those debates are
about. McGinnis argues that there is widespread moral agreement
on most economic issues, which would presumably include private
law subjects such as contract.' There are, however, two reasons to
suppose that moral theories of contract are far from irrelevant.
First, there are some situations in which a person might be
genuinely puzzled not simply about empirical imponderables, but
also about questions of value. Indeed, when we pitch moral princi-
ples at the level of abstraction where they are likely to command
universal assent-for example, "generally speaking, we should keep
our promises"-they tend to become vacuous. Second, even when we
are basically persuaded of the value of a particular approach to
moral questions, we may nevertheless be confused about the precise
implications of that approach.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112
YALE L.J. 829 (2003). Needless to say, not all law and economics scholars share Posner's
pessimistic conclusions. See, e.g., F.H. BucKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE: A THEORY OF CONTRACT 34
(2005) ("For a satisfactory explanation of these [puzzles about contractual obligation], we
must turn from reliance, benefits and will theories to the law-and-economics account of
contract law.").
9. HART, supra note 7, at 88-91.
10. JULES L. COLEMAN, RIsKs AND WRONGS 7 (1992).
11. See McGinnis, supra note 2, at 48.
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The challenges and possibilities inherent in the discussion of
contract law and its relationship to morality are on display in the
essays collected here. Peter Alces questions the very possibility of a
moral theory of contract by arguing that contract doctrine is not
the sort of thing about which morality can speak." At the opposite
end of the theoretical spectrum, James Gordley shows that the
Aristotelian view of law, which he has argued provides the best
explanation of contracts,1 3 can be extended normatively to thorny
issues of paternalistic regulation. 14 Finally, Peter Benson and Jody
Kraus address in very different ways the issue of constructing an
interpretive theory of contract law. Benson uses the Rawlsian idea
of public reason to explain what he takes to be the morality latent
in contract doctrine itself. 5 Kraus, in contrast, argues that eco-
nomic and deontic theories of contract have differing advantages.
Economics provides determinate answers on specific questions,
whereas deontic theories have less determinancy but superior
justificatory force.'6
In many ways, the powerful trend toward empiricism in the
American legal academy is a salutary force. Theory can be given to
excess for which fact can be a powerful antidote. Nevertheless,
contract law continues to present questions and problems that
moral theory may productively attack and discuss. At the very least,
these essays demonstrate that attempts to deploy moral theory to
discuss contract law can be "proved ... to be worthy of the interest of
an intelligent man [or woman]."1"
12. Peter A. Alces, The Moral Impossibility of Contract, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1647
(2007).
13. See generally JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE (1991).
14. James Gordley, Morality and Contract: The Question of Paternalism, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1733 (2007).
15. Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673
(2007).
16. Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Legal Justification, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1773 (2007).
17. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (June 1, 1922), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 265 (Richard Posner ed., 1992).
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